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This paper analyses the relationship between monetary policy and asset prices in the
context of optimal policy rules. The transmission mechanism is represented by a linearized
rational expectations model augmented for the eﬀect of asset prices on aggregate demand.
Stabilization objectives are represented by a discounted quadratic loss function penalizing
inﬂation and output gap volatility. Asset prices are allowed to deviate from their intrinsic
value due to momentum trading. We ﬁn dt h a ti nt h ep r e s e n c eo fw e a l t he ﬀects and
ineﬃcient markets, asset price misalignments from their fundamentals should be included
in the optimal interest rate reaction function.
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1 Introduction
O v e rt h el a s tt w e n t yy e a r s ,s i g n i ﬁcant changes have occurred in the institutional and macroe-
conomic framework that central banks operate. In particular, there has been a widespread
move towards ﬁnancial liberalization, both within and across national borders, especially
after the 1980s, while inﬂation rates have become lower and less variable. The disinﬂation
process of the 1990s has been a global phenomenon since it is observed both in countries
where formal inﬂation targets are in use, and in non-targeting countries1. The decline in
inﬂation has gone hand in hand with a similar decline in interest rates. In many countries,
both short term and long term interest rates are close to, or even bellow, post-war lows. As
Bean (2003) argues, price stability has not been achieved at the expense of the real economy,
as unemployment has been decreasing in a number of countries, while growth has also been
relatively stable. Despite the good macroeconomic record of the past decade, there has been
a growing concern among academics and policymakers that the achievement of price stability
may be associated with an increased risk of ﬁnancial instability.
Some commentators claim that the lower cost of capital along with exuberant growth
projections have boosted the late 1990s stock market bubble. For instance, Borio and Lowe
(2002) argue that booms and busts in asset prices should be considered as part of a broader
∗We would like to thank Charles Goodhart, Jim Malley for their most useful comments and suggestions.
Any remaining errors are sole responsibility of the authors.
1See e.g. Johnson (2002) for international evidence.
1set of symptoms that typically also include a build-up of debt and high rate of capital accumu-
lation. Rising asset prices and debt accumulation lead to stretched household and corporate
balance sheets, vulnerable to sharp corrections of the type recently witnessed in global equity
markets. In a series of articles, Goodhart and Hofmann (2000, 2003) establish empirically
the link between output growth, credit aggregates, and asset price movements in a number
of major economies. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) develop a theoretical model that exhibits
a crucial interaction between collateral values, asset prices, credit and economic activity.
During the period of boom, balance sheets may look healthy as the increase in asset prices,
and consequently the value of the collateral, oﬀsets the build-up of debt. However, when
optimism about further increases in asset values turns to pessimism, leading to a decrease in
the net worth of households and ﬁrms, then ﬁnancial distress may be the result of ﬁnancial
imbalances unwinding. It has been argued that the widespread ﬁnancial deregulation of asset
markets may have contributed to an increase in the frequency of such boom-bust episodes
(IMF, 2003).
An important issue related to the above concerns is the establishment of the appropriate
monetary policy response to asset price movements. Should the central bank care about
the ﬁnancial instability associated with large asset price ﬂuctuations? Nowadays, everyone
recognizes price level stability as the primary objective of monetary policy. Indeed, as Issing
(2003) emphasizes, price stability and ﬁnancial stability tend to mutually reinforce each
other in the long run. However, as the examples of the US in the 1920s and 1990s and Japan
in the late 1980s demonstrate, ﬁnancial imbalances may build up even in an environment
of stable prices (Borio and Lowe, 2002). Exponents of the ’new environment’ hypothesis
argue that low and stable rates of inﬂation may even foster asset price bubbles, due e.g. to
excessively optimistic expectations about future economic prospects. Thus, price stability is
not a suﬃcient condition for ﬁnancial stability. Among the exponents of the new environment
hypothesis, Crocket (2003) claims that: “[...] if the monetary policy reaction function does not
incorporate ﬁnancial imbalances, the monetary anchor may fail to deliver ﬁnancial stability”.
The current consensus however, stresses that monetary policy should be directed exclusively
at achieving price stability, and its role in promoting ﬁnancial stability should be restricted to
restricted to minimising the negative eﬀects from bubbles bursting and ﬁnancial imbalances
unwinding2.
A number of studies tried to provide an answer to the question of whether monetary
policy should respond to asset prices, by simulating macroeconomic models where aggregate
demand is aﬀected by consumption wealth eﬀects and/or investment balance sheet eﬀects.
The simulation evidence of Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) and Gilchrist and Leahy (2002)
opts for a reactive monetary policy response since they show that a central bank dedicated
to price stability should pay no attention to asset prices per se, except insofar as they signal
changes to expected inﬂation. On the other hand, Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani
(2000), and Kontonikas and Ioannidis (2005) ﬁnd that, in line with the new environment
proactive view, overall macroeconomic volatility can be reduced with a (mild) reaction of
2For instance, Alan Greenspan (2002) argues that: ”The notion that a well-timed incremental tightening
could have been calibrated to prevent the late 1990s bubble is almost surely an illusion. Instead, we...need
to focus on policies to mitigate the fallout when it occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition to the next
expansion.”
2interest rates to asset price misalignments from fundamentals3. Also, recent econometric
evidence by Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2004) for the UK, and Chadha, Sarno and Valente
(2003) for UK, US and Japan, suggests that monetary policymakers may use asset prices not
only as part of their information set for setting interest rates, but also as elements in their
reaction function. Chadha et al. (2003) use various measures of asset market disequilibria,
such as the dividend-price ratio and the log diﬀerence in stock prices and exchange rates
in their extended monetary policy rule, while Kontonikas and Montagnoli employ the log
diﬀerence in stock prices and house prices.
All the aforementioned papers use the assumption that monetary policy is characterised
by an augmented Taylor rule, where the nominal interest rate responds positively to inﬂation,
demand pressures, and asset prices. Following the seminal work by Taylor (1993), feedback
rules conditioning the interest rate instrument on current or expected inﬂation and the output
gap have been extensively analysed in the theoretical and empirical literature. Svensson
(1997), and Clark, Goodhart and Huang (1999) among others, show that such a feedback rule
is optimal in that it derives from the ﬁrst order condition for the optimisation of the central
bank’s objectives4. In this paper, we try to shed some more light in the relationship between
monetary policy and asset prices in the context of optimal policy rules. In essence, we will
examine whether there is any underlying theoretical motivation for the increasingly frequent
use of an augmented (for asset prices) Taylor rule. To do so, we start from a backward-
looking structural macroeconomic model where asset prices aﬀect future inﬂation indirectly,
through wealth eﬀects on aggregate demand. In our model, market ineﬃciency implies that
asset prices may deviate from their fundamental value due to ’momentum’ eﬀects from past
asset price changes. In the context of our model if there are wealth eﬀects in aggregate
demand, monetary policy already takes into account asset prices indirectly (and with lag) by
responding to output movements. The question that then arises is whether an extra direct
reaction to deviations from fundamentals can be derived in an optimal setting.
Our results suggest that monetary policy should respond to asset price misalignments
from their fundamental value, with the aggressiveness of the response being a positive func-
tion of the impact of asset prices on aggregate demand. We show that the optimal response
to asset price disequilibria depends on the role of asset prices in the monetary policy trans-
mission mechanism and the source of the asset price movements. If asset price increases
can be justiﬁed on the basis of improvements in fundamentals only, then monetary policy
will accomodate the boom by not responding directly to asset prices. If however, asset price
movements cannot be explained by fundamentals only, then optimal monetary policy will
systematically respond to the non-fundamental component of asset prices. This result has
3The aforementioned studies employ a new keynesian framework with sticky prices in order to examine the
potential stabilisation beneﬁts from monetary policy actions. This work has, at time, received some critisism;
for instance as Kiley (2003, p. 1114) points out ”optimal policies in such work are likely to have trival beneﬁts”.
Since economic ﬂuctuations are mainly driven by exogenous shocks in productivity, they ”are primarily an
eﬃcient response to shifts in the economic environment, and hence optimal stabilisation policy only improves
welfare slightly” (p.1089).
4One should keep in mind though, that simple instrument rules like the Taylor rule and its variants may not
correspond to fully optimal policy in the context of a particular economic model (see e.g. Woodford, 2001).
Also, as Svensson, (2003) argues, no central bank has so far made a commitment to a simple instrument rule
like the Taylor rule or variants thereof. In addition, neither has any central bank announced a particular
instrument rule as a guideline.
3important implications for the conduct of monetary policy and contributes crucially to the
existing literature, as previous work on deriving optimal interest rate rules considering asset
prices, either fails to ﬁnd a role for asset prices (Bean, 2003), or obtains complex, non linear
rules (Bordo and Jeanne, 2002), or doesn’t explicitly model the non-fundamental component
of asset prices (Smets, 1997).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical
model. In Section 3 we derive the optimal interest rate rule based upon dynamic optimization
of the central bank’s objectives. Section 4 analyzes the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We use a structural backward-looking model of a closed economy that allows for the eﬀect of
asset prices on aggregate demand. The model augments the standard Ball (1999) and Svens-
son (1997) speciﬁcation by taking into account asset prices, which themselves are assumed to
stochastically evolve inﬂuenced by both fundamentals and momentum trading. The model is
given by the following equations:
πt+1 = πt + ayt + ²t+1 (1)




t + b∆qt−1 (3)
q∗
t = −δ1 (it − Et [πt+1]) + δ2E [yt+1]+ut (4)
where yt is the deviation of (log) output from its steady-state level (output gap), πt is the
inﬂation rate (strictly, the deviation from target), pt is (log) price level, it is the monetary
policy instrument (one-period nominal interest rate), qt denotes (log) real asset prices and q∗
t
the fundamentals. Diﬀerent interpretations of qt are possible (e.g. house prices, stock prices
or the value of a portfolio containing both housing and equity investment), in what follows
though we mainly treat it is an equity index. ²t+1, ηt+1, ut represent exogenous random shocks
to aggregate demand, inﬂation, and asset price fundamentals. For simplicity, we assume that
they are mutually uncorrelated i.i.d. processes with zero means and constant variances. The
structural parameters can be interpreted as partial elasticities with the following properties:
0 < β1 < 1; a, β2, δ1, δ2 > 0; β3 > 0, 0 6 b<1.
Eq.(1) is a standard accelerationist (or backward-looking NAIRU type) Phillips Curve
where the change in inﬂation is a positive function of the lagged output gap and the inﬂation
shock. Such a speciﬁcation has also been adopted by Ball (1999), Svensson (1997) and
Rudesbusch and Svensson (1999)5. The presence of inﬂation inertia in the inﬂation equation
implies that disinﬂations will be costly in terms of output losses, thus there is a short-run
5Rudebusch (2002) considers the hybrid Phillips curve: πt+1 = µππt +( 1− µπ)Et+1[πt+2]+ayt+1 + ²t+1,
and points out that the accelerationist Phillips curve (µπ ≈ 1) can be derived from well-known models of
price-setting behavior (see e.g. Roberts, 1995).
4trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and the output. However, since lagged inﬂation enters Eq. (1)
with unity coeﬃcient, the model implies a vertical long-run Phillips curve. This process is
also consistent with the empirical ﬁnding that inﬂation in the major industrialised countries
is so highly persistent that it may indeed contain a unit root as some studies have shown (see
e.g. Evans, 1991; Grier and Perry, 1998). Eq. (1) posits no role for expected future inﬂation
in the inﬂation adjustment equation. The parameter a is a positive constant which measures
the sensitivity of inﬂation to excess demand6.
The demand side, as given by Eq. (2), is consistent with the speciﬁcation employed by
Walsh (1998), Ball (1999), and Svensson (1997) with one important diﬀerence: aggregate
demand depends positively on the past level of asset prices via consumption wealth eﬀects
and investment balance sheet eﬀects7. For example, a persistent increase in the level of
asset prices decreases the perceived level of households’ ﬁnancial distress causing a boost in
consumption spending. The balance sheet channel implies a positive relationship between
the ﬁrms’ ability to borrow and their net worth which in turn depends on asset valuations.
There is a vast amount of empirical evidence indicating that stock and house price movements
are strongly correlated with aggregate demand in most major economies8. Parameter β3 in
the aggregate demand equation is of crucial interest since it indicates the magnitude of the
asset price movements’ eﬀects on output. If there are no wealth eﬀects/balance sheet eﬀects
then β3 = 0 and Eq. (2) resembles a traditional dynamic IS curve. In our model, the
central bank takes into account the eﬀect of asset prices on aggregate demand; that is, it is
fully aware of the eﬀect of qt on yt+1 and its magnitude. In other words, we assume that
symmetric information exists between ﬁnancial market participants and the central bank.
It should be pointed out that by conditioning yt+1 on qt, we allow the output gap to be
aﬀected by both the fundamental (q∗
t) and the non-fundamental (qNF
t ) component of the
asset price. This is in line with Filardo (2004) and in contrast to Smets (1997), Gruen,
Plumb and Stone (2003) who condition the output gap only upon the fundamental, non-
fundamental component, respectively. It may be the case that permanent income consumers
would consume from q∗
t only9, however the recent experience of late 1990s indicates that
sustained increases/decreases in asset prices, originating from bubbles and/or changes in the
fundamentals, do aﬀect consumption and investment.
Eqs. (3) and (4), represent the dynamic evolution of asset prices, qt, and their underlying
fundamentals, q∗
t, respectively. As in Kontonikas and Ioannidis (2005), in an eﬀort to depict
actual ﬁnancial market behavior we assume a partial adjustment mechanism that allows
observed asset prices not to always being equal to their fundamental value. Contrary to
6As Clark, Goodhart, and Huang (1999) point out, there are good reasons to believe that a is not constant.
However, the assumption of linearity in the Phillips curve helps to obtain a closed-form solution for the optimal
feedback rule.
7Despite that in principle the quantity of wealth (wealth eﬀects) and/or the value of capital stock (balance-
sheet eﬀects), rather than the level of asset prices, should enter the demand equation, it is standard in the
theoretical (see e.g. Smets, 1997) and empirical (see e.g. Goodhart and Hoﬀman, 2000) literature to augment
the IS using an asset price related variable. This is b a s e do nt h ea s s u m p t i o nt h a tw e a l t ha n dt h ev a l u eo f
capital stock depend positively on the asset price. We thank a referee for raising this point.
8See among others, Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2004) for relevant empirical evidence considering the UK
economy, and Goodhart and Hofmann (2000) for international evidence. A recent study by the IMF (2003)
p o i n t so u tt h a te q u i t yp r i c er e d u c i o n sa re associated with heavy GDP losses.
9We thank a referee for pointing out this issue.
5this, the Eﬃcient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) postulates that all information required to
determine the intrinsic asset value will, by actions of rational proﬁt-maximizing agents, be
reﬂected in the actual market price; hence b =0a n dqt = q∗
t. In the context of the EMH,
the asset price changes if and only if the market receives new information about the asset’s
underlying economic fundamentals, and the actions of speculators are stabilising, in that they
drive the actual asset price towards its fundamental value rather than away from it (e.g. by
buying underpriced assets and selling overpriced ones).
However, the central tenets of the EMH, that future prices are not aﬀected by past asset
price movements and that speculation can only have a stabilizing eﬀect have never been quite
accepted by market participants. As Kortian (1995) points out, several aspects of modern
asset markets trading, support the existence of ’momentum’ eﬀects from past changes in asset
prices. For example, the widespread use of technical analysis, that tries to predict future prices
on the basis of past asset price movements. Also, stop-loss orders (selling orders which are
activated once the asset price has fallen by a particular pre-determined amount) are frequently
employed, and dynamic hedging strategies, such as portfolio insurance, imply that investors
b u yi nar i s i n gm a r k e ta n ds e l li n t oaf a l l i n go n e .All the aformentioned investment strategies,
are based upon past asset price movements and agree with the view that investors from time-
to-time act in a destabilizing manner. Economic history also provides many examples of
destabilizing investment behavior with signiﬁcant implications for asset prices and aggregate
economic activity beginning as early as the seventeenth century10.
Taking these arguments into account, Eq. (3) decomposes actual asset prices into a
fundamental component, q∗
t, and a non-fundamental component, qNF
t = b∆qt−1. The non-
fundamental component indicates that, if asset prices have increased in the past (∆qt−1 > 0)
there is a positive ’momentum’ eﬀect on their current level (b>0). In essence, investors bid
up the demand for asset holdings in expectation that past capital gains will persist in the
future. The higher the value of b, the stronger the eﬀect from past asset price changes and
therefore qt can diverge signiﬁcantly from its fundamental value, q∗
t, albeit not permanently.
But once asset prices revert, at an unknown future date, the downward eﬀect on aggregate
demand could be large. Eq. (3) is essentially a backward-looking version of the Frenkel
and Mussa (1985) asset price model11. Stability of the asset price path requires that the
parameter b satisﬁes: 0 6 b<1.
Obviously, our preferred asset price speciﬁcation depicts only one of the potential types
of departures from the EMH, that is, momentum eﬀects. An alternative model is the rational
stochastic bubble (Blanchard, 1979; Blanchard and Watson, 1982). In the context of it,
bubbles have the property of growing over a certain interval before suddenly collapsing. In
the literature on asset prices and monetary policy, explicit bubble speciﬁcations have been
employed by Filardo (2004) among others. Our model diﬀers from the aformentioned studies,
in the sense that we do not regard the divergence of qt from q∗
t as an explicit bubble since we
do not assign any probabilistic structure to its evolution.
Eq. (4) describes the fundamental component of the asset price in line with the stan-
dard dividend asset pricing model. Hence, a positive eﬀect from expected future dividends
10See Garber (2000) for a discussion on the tulip mania in the early seventeenth century as well as other
famous bubbles.
11Frenkel and Mussa (1985) argue that a wide range of structural models for exchange rate determination
can be subsumed under the reduced form asset price expression: qt = q
∗
t + bEt[∆qt+1].
6(assumed to depend on expected output) and a negative eﬀect from real interest rates is
postulated. This speciﬁcation is in line with the majority of empirical studies examining the
eﬀect of macroeconomic variables on the stock market12. Finally, we allow for uncertainty in
the fundamentals’ process by including the random disturbance term, ut.
3 Optimal interest rate rule
The structure of the model implies that at time t, the central bank chooses the nominal
interest rate, it,w h i c ha ﬀects concurrent real asset prices, next period’s output gap, and two-
periods’ ahead inﬂation while contemporaneous inﬂation and output gap are predetermined
by previous decisions and current exogenous shocks. Solving the model, the original system
of Eqs. (1) − (4) can be re-written compactly as13:
yt+1 = ϕt + υt+1 (5)
πt+1 = kt + ²t+1 (6)
where ϕt ≡ λ1yt −λ2(it −πt)+λ3b∆qt−1 is the control variable of the central bank, since πt,
yt are predetermined when it is chosen, and kt ≡ πt + ayt is the state variable at time t.
We assume that the central bank’s intertemporal quadratic loss function, L,p e n a l i z e s













where λ > 0 is the relative weight attached by the central bank on output stabilisation. τ is
the discount factor, 0 < τ < 1. In the absence of discounting, the postulated loss function is a
weighted average of the conditional volatility of inﬂation and output. It is evident from Eqs.
(5), (6) that at time t, when the interest rate (and consequently ϕt) is chosen the only state
variable is kt. Therefore, the value function is deﬁn e di nt e r m so fkt only, V (kt). Applying
Bellman’s dynamic programming principle, and substituting for the two constraints, Eqs. (5)
and (6), in the value function, we obtain:



























Given the linear-quadratic structure of the model, the solution will be of the form ϕt = ckt.
In terms of the interest rate actually set by the policy maker, we can use the deﬁnitions of
ϕt, kt, λ1, λ2, λ3 and qt to obtain the optimal rule for the nominal interest rate it:
it = fππt + fyyt + fq−q∗(qt − q∗
t)( 1 0 )
12See among others Fama (1981), Conover Jensen and Johnson (1999).
13See Appendix I for a detailed solution.
14See Appendix II for more details.
7where fπ =1−
c(1−β3δ2)
β2+β3δ1 , fy = a +
β1−ca(1−β3δ2)
β2+β3δ1 , fq−q∗ =
β3
β2+β3δ1 are the respective
interest rate weights on inﬂation, output and asset price misalignments from fundamentals.
The ’Taylor principle’ implies that the inﬂation coeﬃcient, fπ, should exceed the value of
one, to ensure a real interest rate response that will lead to lower inﬂation15.
4 Analysis of the results
The rule for adjusting nominal interest rates shown in Eq. (10) indicates that the central
bank should not only take into consideration inﬂation and output, but also react to asset price
disequilibria. In the presence of wealth eﬀects (β3 > 0) the central bank should raise interest
rates in response to higher misalignments ( fq−q∗ > 0). Hence, the optimal response depends
on the role of asset prices in the monetary policy transmission mechanism and the source of
the asset price movements. When asset prices increase due to improvements in fundamentals
only (i.e. ∆qt = ∆q∗
t), for example an increase in productivity, then monetary policy will
accomodate the boom by not responding directly to asset prices16. On the other hand, when
movements in ﬁnancial markets cannot be justiﬁed solely on the basis of changing fundamen-
tals, such as over-optimistic expectations about future developments, then optimal monetary
policy will systematically respond to the non-fundamental component of asset prices. This
ﬁnding is consistent with the simulation evidence provided by Filardo (2004), Kontonikas
and Ioannidis (2005), and Cecchetti et al. (2000). Using a rational stochastic bubble model
to describe non-fundamentals, Filardo (2004) showed that it is more eﬃcient for the central
bank to focus only on the non-fundamental, rather than the fundamental component of asset
prices, when calibrating its monetary policy response. Kontonikas and Ioannidis (2005) sim-
ulate a forward-looking variant of the macroeconomic model presented here, and ﬁnd that
a mild response to asset price disequilibria (fq−q∗ =0 .1) promotes overall macroeconomic
stability. Such a pro-active response has also been advocated by Cecchetti et al. (2000) using
the Bernake and Gertler (1999) new keynesian sticky wages - ﬁnancial accelerator model.
A common feature in the aforementioned studies is that they assume, rather than derive, a
rule for interest rate setting and then examine the eﬀects on macroeconomic volatility from
reacting or not reacting to asset prices. Our main focus however, was to show that in the
context of optimal central bank behavior, asset price misalignments should be an element in
the monetary authority’s feedback rule. Hence, this paper extends the literature that obtains
analytical expressions for interest rates based upon optimization of the central banks’ objec-
tives. The augmented Taylor rule depicted by Eq. (10) points out explicitly that the ﬁnancial
and real instability associated with growing ﬁnancial imbalances should not be tolerated by
the central bank.
Optimal monetary policy in our model is in line with the suggestions provided by Allen
and Gale (2000), in the sense that it is desirable for the central bank to step in and provide
liquidity and prevent asset prices falling below the level justiﬁed by the underlying funda-
mentals. Our results are related to the ﬁndings of Smets (1997) in the case of symmetric
information between policymakers and ﬁnancial market participants with one important dif-
15As we show in Appendix III, fπ > 1a n dfy > 0i f06 β3δ2 < 1.
16As previously mentioned, in the context of our model if there are wealth eﬀects in aggregate demand,
monetary policy already takes into account asset prices indirectly (and with lag) by responding to output
movements.
8ference, that is, in his model there is an optimal reaction of interest rates to the actual real
asset price, rather than its non-fundamental component. Smets (1997) examines also the
case of asymmetric information, i.e. when ﬁnancial market participants have information not
available to policymakers. He shows that with asymmetric information optimal monetary
policy reacts to asset prices, even when there is no link between asset prices and aggregate
demand (β3 = 0), since current prices contain information about current supply shocks. Par-
ticularly, when rising asset prices are due to positive supply shocks (which in turn lower the
inﬂation forecast) it is optimal to reduce interest rates. Our view however, is that, despite
that asset market participants may have stronger ﬁnancial incentives to acquire information
about current market conditions, there is no reason to assume that their information set is
superior to that of modern central banks. In another study related to ours, Bean (2003)
also assumes a wealth eﬀects augmented demand curve in his analysis, but the results that
he obtains for optimal policy diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the ones presented here. In partic-
ular, Bean ﬁnds no role for asset prices in the commitment and discretionary equilibrium.
Bean’s optimality conditions contain neither the policy instrument, nor anything to do with
the demand side of the economy. Finally, our results diﬀer from Bordo and Jeanne (2002)
who show that the monetary policy response to asset prices movements is highly non-linear
and is dependent on the probability of the bubble emerging17. In our framework we derive
a linear response to asset price disequilibria that does not depend upon assumptions about
the probabilistic nature of the bubble. In essence, we obtain the optimal interest rate as a
function of asset price misalignments (qt − q∗
t) that can be approximated by b∆qt−1. Hence,
central bank policies can be based upon the observable level of (past) asset price inﬂation18.
Indeed, Chadha et al. (2003) estimate an augmented Taylor rule using the past change in
stock prices as a measure of stock market disequilibrium, as suggested by our optimal rule,
and ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant reaction.
It is easy to show that the standard Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) can be obtained as a special
case of the augmented rule in two cases. First, in the absence of a link between aggregate
demand and asset prices, i.e. β3 = 0, there is no scope for monetary policy to directly react
to asset prices (fq−q∗ = 0), and the feedback rule which implements optimal policy takes the
form of a Taylor rule with the interest rate being an increasing function of inﬂation and the
output gap.
it = fππt + fyyt (11)












Second, if markets are eﬃcient and actual asset prices are always equal to their intrinsic
value (b = 0), there is no direct monetary policy reaction to asset prices. In this case,
17Bordo and Jeanne (2002) use a three period model as in Kent and Lowe (1997).
18As we already argued, our ’momentum eﬀects’ measure of asset price disequibria is one of the possible
speciﬁcations that have been employed in the literature. Allowing for alternative departures from the Eﬃcient
Markets Hypothesis, such as the rational stochastic bubble model (Blanchard and Watson, 1982), would not
invalidate our main result. In other words, it is easy to show within our framework that in an optimal setting,
interest rates react only to the non-fundamental component of asset prices, with the reaction being stronger
as wealth eﬀects grow. The drawback of such alternative speciﬁc a t i o n si st h a t ,a sp o i n t e do u tb yB o r d oa n d
Jeanne (2002), the optimality of a monetary policy action depends upon subjective assesments about the
probability of a bubble emerging and/or bursting. We thank a referee for raising this issue.
9monetary policy takes into account asset prices, indirectly and with a lag, via their demand
wealth eﬀects.
In order to further examine the impact of asset prices on the interest rate setting behavior
of the central bank, we calculate the elasticity of the extended Taylor rule reaction coeﬃcients
in Eq. (10) with respect to the magnitude of wealth eﬀects, β3. The results, presented in
Table 1 below, lead to Propositions 1 to 3.
[TABLE 1]
Proposition 1 The stronger the wealth eﬀect, β3, the smaller is the optimal interest rate
weight on inﬂation.
Proof: since β2, β3, δ1, δ2 are all positive and c<0, 1 > β3δ2,i ti si m p l i e dt h a t
∂fπ/∂β3 < 0.
Proposition 2 The stronger the wealth eﬀect, β3, the smaller is the optimal interest rate
weight on output gap.
Proof: since β2, β3, δ1, δ2, a are all positive and c<0, 1 > β3δ2,i ti si m p l i e dt h a t
∂fy/∂β3 < 0.
Thus, when the role of capital markets as creator of wealth and collateral is taken into
account, the magnitude of the inﬂation related-interest rate adjustment should be smaller.
This does not imply that the central bank intervenes less frequently. In fact, if the true
data generation process for aggregate demand is given by the augmented IS, Eq. (2), then
monetary policy may have to be more frequently adjusted. Proposition 1 suggests that
as wealth eﬀects build up, a too aggressive interest rate response to inﬂation may lead to
recession and threaten the price stability objective. In addition, Proposition 2 calls for a less
pronounced response to the output gap in the presence of a signiﬁcant correlation between
asset prices and aggregate demand.
Proposition 3 T h es t r o n g e rt h ew e a l t he ﬀect, β3, the larger is the optimal interest rate
weight on asset price misalignments from fundamentals.
Proof: since β2, β3 and δ1 are all positive, it is implied that ∂fq−q∗/∂β3 > 0.
The intuition and policy implications of Propositions 1 and 2 become clearer when con-
sidered in combination with Proposition 3. In essence, if aggregate demand is aﬀected by
the evolution of asset prices then monetary authorities should include asset price misalign-
ments in their optimal feedback rule and there should be a change in the distribution of the
relevant interest rate weights. Particularly, the interest rate weight on inﬂation and output
decreases while the weight attached to asset price misalignments increases. This allows asset
prices to be considered as an element of the authorities’ reaction function without necessarily
implying overall tighter, than before, policy since the response to inﬂation and output will be
less aggressive. In other words, our results imply that ﬁrst, asset price misalignments should
10have an independent role and not only be considered as instruments to help forecast output
and inﬂation; and second, there should be a shift in the magnitude of reaction, away from
the traditional variables (inﬂation, output gap) and towards a direct response to ﬁnancial
imbalances.
In order to gain some further insight in the properties of the model, we calculate the
optimal interest rate coeﬃcients (fπ, fy, fq−q∗) by calibrating the behavioral parameters in
Eqs. (1) − (4). For the coeﬃcients (a,β1,β2) we employ the values used by Ball (1999). In
the Phillips curve, Eq. (1), the sensitivity of inﬂation to the output gap, a, is set to 0.4. In
the aggregate demand, Eq. (2), the interest rate slope, β2, is 1; the autoregressive output
coeﬃcient, β1,i s0 .8 ;w h i l eav a l u eo f0 .1 is employed for the elasticity of aggregate demand
with respect to asset price changes (β3). This value is consistent with the Bank of England’s
model for consumption expenditure, where 1 percent rise in real net ﬁnancial wealth and real
gross housing wealth boosts aggregate spending by 0.12 percent in the long run (Gramlich,
2002). Following Kontonikas and Ioannidis (2005), in Eq. (4), the expected output eﬀect on
current fundamentals, δ2, is assumed to be twice as large as the interest rate eﬀect, δ1,( 0 .8
as opposed to 0.4). Finally, in the asset price adjustment Eq. (3) we allow for momentum
trading since b 6=0( b =0 .5). The lag structure of the model is more appropriate for annual
data therefore we use a discount factor τ =0 .96. For the parameter values shown in Table 2
and equal weight on inﬂation and output in the loss function (λ = 1) the optimal policy rule
becomes:
it =1 .7πt +0 .9yt +0 .1(qt − q∗
t)
The coeﬃcient of the asset price disequilibrium term is 0.1, consistent with the empirical
estimates in Chadha et al. (2003) and Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2004). It is also in
line with the simulation evidence of Kontonikas and Ioannidis (2005), whereas such a mild
response to asset price misalignments leads to lower overall macroeconomic volatility. Figure
1 plots the optimal reaction coeﬃcients as a function of the magnitude of wealth eﬀects (β3).
As implied from Propositions (1-3), the interest rate weights on inﬂation and the output gap
are negatively related to β3, while the response to asset price misalignments is increasing in
β3.
[TABLE 2]
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Although there is still no widespread agreement among economists on whether central banks
should explicitly target asset price inﬂation, in addition to conventional consumer price in-
ﬂation targets, a vast consensus that emerges states that the ﬁnancial-market channel plays
an important role in the transmission of the monetary policy. Our aim in this paper is to
examine how the conduct of monetary policy is aﬀected by the dynamic evolution of asset
prices. Starting from these considerations, we build a backward-looking structural macro
model where asset price ﬂuctuations have an impact on aggregate demand and consequently
11on inﬂation. A crucial property of our model is that the asset market is not necessarily eﬃ-
cient, thereby generating deviations between actual asset prices and their fundamental value.
In order to construct the optimal interest rate rule, we assume that the central bank solves
a stochastic control problem to minimise intertemporally the variance of the output gap and
inﬂation.
The derived optimal policy rule conditions the monetary policy instrument not only on
inﬂation and demand pressures, as standard in the Taylor rule literature, but also on ﬁnancial
imbalances, as represented by asset price misalignments from fundamentals. The magnitude
of the interest rate reaction depends, among other factors, on the relative importance of
wealth eﬀects for aggregate demand. The response to asset market disequilibria becomes
more aggressive as wealth eﬀects build up, while the reaction to inﬂation and the output gap
becomes less pronounced. The derived augmented Taylor rule, nests the standard Taylor rule
as a special case. When there is no diﬀerence between actual and intrinsic asset value and/or
when there are no aggregate demand wealth eﬀects, then the interest rate should respond to
inﬂation and demand pressures only.
Thus, our main contribution is to extend the optimal monetary policy literature towards
recognizing that, in the presence of wealth eﬀects and ineﬃcient capital markets, monetary
authorities should grant an independent role to asset prices and not only regard them as
instruments to help forecast inﬂation and output. Future work should consider an open
economy model, where the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing and the households’ capital gains derive not only
from domestic but also from foreign capital markets.
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Substituting for fundamentals, q∗
t, in Eq. (3) we get an alternative expression for real
asset prices:
qt = b∆qt−1 − δ1 (it − Et [πt+1]) + δ2E [yt+1]+ut (12)
We then use this expression to eliminate qt from the aggregate demand Eq. (2):
yt+1 = β1yt − β2 (it − Et [πt+1]) +
β3 [b∆qt−1 − δ1 (it − Et [πt+1]) + δ2E [yt+1]+ut]+ηt+1 (13)
Collecting (it − Etπt+1) terms:
yt+1 = β1yt − (β2 + β3δ1)(it − Et [πt+1]) (14)
+β3(b∆qt−1 + δ2E [yt+1]+ut)+ηt+1
Using the expectational version of Eq. (1) to substitute for Et [πt+1] and rearranging we
obtain:
yt+1 =[ β1 + a(β2 + β3δ1)]yt − (β2 + β3δ1)(it − πt)( 1 5 )
+β3(b∆qt−1 + δ2E [yt+1]) + υt+1
where υt+1 = β3ut + ηt+1. Thus, the composite output shock (υt+1) can be decomposed
into pure demand-shock (ηt+1) and shock to asset prices (ut). The magnitude of the asset
price shock on output depends on the magnitude of wealth eﬀects (β3).
Taking expectations on both sides of the above expression, conditional upon time t infor-
mation, yields the following expression for Et [yt+1]:
Et[yt+1]=λ1yt − λ2(it − πt)+λ3b∆qt−1 (16)
where λ1 =
β1+a(β2+β3δ1)
1−β3δ2 , λ2 =
β2+β3δ1
1−β3δ2 , λ3 =
β3
1−β3δ2
Using Eq. (16) to eliminate E [yt+1] from Eq. (15) yields:
yt+1 = λ1yt − λ2(it − πt)+λ3b∆qt−1 + υt+1 (17)
We now deﬁne ϕt as the the control variable of the central bank, since πt, yt are predetermined
when it is chosen:
ϕt ≡ λ1yt − λ2(it − πt)+λ3b∆qt−1 (18)
Thus, the original system of Eqs. (1) − (4) can be re-written compactly as:
yt+1 = ϕt + υt+1 (19)
πt+1 = kt + ²t+1 (20)
where kt ≡ πt + ayt is the state variable at time t.
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The objective is to minimize L subject to the constraint that:
kt+1 = πt+1 + ayt+1
= kt + aϕt + $t+1
where $t+1 = ²t+1 + a υt+1
The value function,V (kt), is the expected present value of the policymaker’s loss function
if ϕt+i is set optimally. The value function is deﬁned in terms of the state variable, kt:








2 + λ(ϕt + υt+1)
2
i
+ τV (kt + aϕt + $t+1)
¾
(22)
The ﬁrst order condition that yields the optimal response is:
∂V (kt)
∂ϕt
=0⇔ λϕt + aτEtV 0 (kt + aϕt + $t+1)=0 ( 2 3 )



















kt + τEtV 0 (kt + aϕt + $t+1)
¤
dkt ⇐⇒
V 0(kt)=kt + τEtV 0 (kt + aϕt + $t+1)( 2 4 )
Multiplying Eq. (24) by a and adding it to Eq. (23) yields:


















18Substituting the derived expression for EtV 0(kt+1)b a c ki n t ot h eﬁrst order condition yields:
λϕt + aτ
·



















Et[ϕt+1]( 2 5 )
When policy is set at time t, kt summaries the state, so optimal policy, given the linear-
quadratic structure, will be of the form ϕt = ckt. Using this proposed policy, and recalling












This yields the following quadratic equation for c:
aτλc2 −
¡
λ − λτ + a2τ
¢
c − aτ =0 ( 2 6 )




λ − λτ + a2τ +
q







λ − λτ + a2τ −
q
(λ − τλ+ a2τ)
2 +4 a2τ2λ
¶
To determine which of these solutions we accept, note that:
kt+1 = kt + aϕt =( 1+ac)kt
so that kt+1 is a stable process if and only if c<0s ot h a t1+ac < 1. Now consider the
product of the two solutions c1 and c2:
c1c2 =
¡
λ − τλ+ a2τ
¢2 −
h¡











So one solution must be positive the other negative. We are looking for the negative solution,







λ − λτ + a2τ −
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The inﬂation coeﬃcient in the interest rate reaction function, fπ, has to be greater than
one in order to satisfy the stability condition that real rates increase in response to inﬂation,







< 0( 2 8 )
Since β2 + β3δ1 > 0, c<0, β3 > 0 the stability condition can be re-expressed as:
0 6 β3δ2 < 1( 2 9 )
Note also that if 0 6 β3δ2 < 1, a countecyclical monetary policy response is ensured with
interest rates increasing in response to higher output gap, since the output gap coeﬃcient in
the interest rate reaction function, fy = a +
β1−ca(1−β3δ2)
β2+β3δ1 , becomes unambigously positive.
20